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I define as "submarine statutes" a category of statutes that affect the mean-
ing of later-passed statutes. A submarine statute calls for courts to apply future
statutes differently than they would have otherwise. An example is the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which requires, in some circumstances, exemptions
for religious exercise from otherwise compulsory statutory requirements. A new
statute can only be understood if its interaction with the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act is also understood. While scholars have debated the constitutional-
ity of some statutes like these, I argue that submarine statutes carry an
overlooked cost. Namely, they add complexity to the legal background of which
a legislator must be aware if he or she is sensibly to express an intention in a
new piece of legislation. The thicker the legislative waters are with submarines,
the more legislatures are called to make common-law-like surveys of the legal
landscape in order to understand the legislation they draft. I discuss several
options for controlling the cognitive cost submarines impose on future legisla-
tion, including quasi-constitutionalization, super-statutization, and segregation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") imposes a serious
and seriously unappreciated cost.' One can criticize or defend this statute on
any number of grounds, substantive and procedural.2 But I have in mind
RFRA's membership in a class of legislative acts that exhibit a peculiar kind
of congressional mischief. I call these statutes "submarine statutes."
While most statutes stand alone or work with a few other statutes to
specify the law that will be used by courts to resolve disputes, submarine
statutes lie in wait to affect the applications of later-passed statutes that are
otherwise unrelated. For example, RFRA requires the federal government to
exempt religious exercise from the mandates of future statutes when certain
conditions are met.3 New laws, therefore, have meaning only in light of what
RFRA also says.
In short, the very meaning of a newly passed statute can be struck by
the torpedo of a silent submarine that had been patrolling hidden in the
depths. With each additional submarine, the cost to the legislature of passing
a statute and achieving any given purpose rises. Moreover, the complexity of
creating legislative meaning increases ever more with the number of invisi-
ble cross-references lying in wait. Because submarines like RFRA impose
costs on the future business of legislation, those increased costs must be
justified.
In this essay, I first outline what constitutes the category of submarine
statutes. Second, I argue that submarine statutes impose complexity costs
and that these costs, if great enough, compromise an implicit democratic
principle of initial legislative intention. Finally, I consider whether these
problems might be ameliorated if submarines are segregated as quasi-consti-
tutional provisions or as members of a small class of so-called super-
statutes.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1, 2000bb-4 (2012).
2 See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommoda-
tion: Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Bad Public Policy, 9 HARV. L. & Pot'y
REv. 129, 137-50 (2015) (critiquing the statute for being misleading and opaque, for resulting
from dishonest lobbying, and for its negative consequences); Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 883, 895-97 (1994) (argu-
ing that RFRA importantly protects the ability to practice, and not just believe in, the religion
of one's choice).
3 See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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II. WHAT MAKES A SUBMARINE?
A. Criteria and RFRA
Submarine statutes work by altering the meanings of future legislative
acts. 4 If time were made to run in reverse, such a statute could be understood
as a very general amendment to a large class of prior statutes. Legislatures
are legitimately empowered to do even great violence to the law that came
before.' An amendment can clear away and obliterate the legislative work of
the past; that is just democracy. But, alas, we are all growing older, not
younger, and the prospective amendment today of a statute that is yet to be is
not at all like a retroactive amendment of an existing statute. A submarine,
unlike an ordinary amendment, can unexpectedly and substantially disrupt
the legislative work of the future.
The problem I focus on here is not that passing such statutes is formally
beyond the legislature's power. Perhaps a statute's submarine character
would contribute to such a conclusion, but I take no position on that here.6
Nor does anyone dispute that a later-passed act can specifically bar the use
of the submarine. Formally, therefore, the submarine possesses no unusual or
heightened authority over other statutes. But an ocean thick with submarines
is a hazardous place for ordinary ships. And legislation passed in an environ-
ment thick with submarine statutes is a very uncertain creature. If the legal
world is replete with exemptions and modifications scattered among the leg-
islature's prior work, the meaning of a statute written today may pass beyond
practical understanding, even in the ordinary and loose sense in which statu-
tory text is thought to have meaning.
Take RFRA. It requires, roughly, exemptions from any federal law that
substantially burdens religious exercise, unless the legal interference results
from the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental in-
terest.7 Lest there be any doubt, Congress made clear that such exemptions
apply to all future statutes except those that specifically declare RFRA not to
4 RFRA, of course, applies to all statutes, past and present, unless specifically excluded. I
focus here on submarines' effects on future acts of legislation. The obscuring effect of their
retroactive applications as general amendments to the entire U.S. Code is related but not within
the scope of this article.
William Baude and Stephen Sachs, for example, do not share Jeremy Bentham's concern
that "it is next to impossible to follow [a new statute] through and discern the limits of its
influence." William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079, 1098 (2017) (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 236 (H.L.A. Hart ed.,
Univ. of London Athlone Press 1970) (1782)). Their acceptance of the retrospective damage
and adjustments that can be caused by new statutes is unremarkable. Their reasoning that
"[i]ntegrating new law with the old, even in a haphazard way, helps the legislature focus on
particular issues and solve problems one at a time," id., however, is remarkable and has impli-
cations for the submarine, the statute that amends future, not prior, statutes.
6 For discussion of work that does focus on such questions and the implications of that
work on the policy issues I wrestle with here, see infra Part III.A.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct.
2751, 2760-62 (2014).
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be applicable.' What a new piece of legislation will mean in a future case
therefore depends not only on its interpretation standing alone, but also on
the interpretation of its coupled interaction with RFRA in a specific factual
setting.9
For example, the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") requires, with various
exceptions, employers' qualifying health insurance plans to cover certain ser-
vices.' 0 It specifically mandates coverage of that preventative care and
screening for women that is identified in "comprehensive guidelines sup-
ported by the Health Resources and Services Administration.""
We now know that, because of RFRA, this provision sometimes does
not mean what it apparently says. Unless the government meets the demands
of strict scrutiny, it cannot require an employer to cover such identified ser-
vices, whether contraception or mammograms, when doing so would con-
flict with the employer's religious beliefs. 2 Because the Affordable Care Act
did not explicitly repeal or waive RFRA and because this section of the Act
does not necessarily conflict with RFRA, the section's very meaning de-
pends on what RFRA requires in each fact-intensive, religious scenario
across a broad temporal and geographic range. What will the statute mean
for future workers and employers, living in a world of religious and social
practices different from our own? Who can say?
Whether exemptions from the edicts of a new statute will be wide-
spread or rare, relatively insignificant or striking closer to the heart of the
statutory purpose, these things cannot be known in advance as they depend
on the emergence of factual circumstances alongside evolving geographies
of religious organizations, membership, doctrine, and practice. In a very real
sense, we do not know what a new statute will actually do until the com-
mands of RFRA are implemented in circumstances of unknown religious
demands, unknown states of religious demographics, and unknown secular
versus religious conflicts."
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b) ("Federal statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993, is
subject to this chapter unless such law explicitly excludes such application by reference to this
chapter.").
9 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S.
Code, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 249, 253 (1995) ("[W]hat an extraordinary modification of govern-
mental power it is! RFRA operates as a sweeping 'super-statute,' cutting across all other fed-
eral statutes (now and future, unless specifically exempted) and modifying their reach.").
' 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012) (requiring health plans to cover without cost-sharing
certain evidence-based care and, in addition, "with respect to women, such additional preven-
tive care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the
Health Resources and Services Administration for purposes of this paragraph").
"Id.
2 See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2775-85 (finding a RFRA-based exemption from a mandate
to cover certain forms of contraception).
" Cf Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) ("Any society adopting such a
system would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the soci-
ety's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them.").
Smith concerned the application of RFRA-like strict scrutiny as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, where congressional override is not possible. See id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
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Of course, all statutes are more like waves that break uncertainly on
future shores than they are enduring judgments in waiting. RFRA's modify-
ing influence is not responsible for all the uncertainty in these ACA provi-
sions. But a legislator contemplating a statute like the ACA must take RFRA
into account if he or she is to understand what a vote for the statute
represents.
B. Identifying Submarines
RFRA is certainly not alone in purporting to affect the execution of
future, otherwise unrelated statutes. Not all such statutes are submarines.
Some have little effect on meaning. Others, though they affect meaning, and
so fit my definition of submarine statutes, are sufficiently conspicuous that
they are not subject to the critique I make in Part El1.
First, some future-affecting statutes are not costly in the manner I have
so far loosely described as complicating the task of ascertaining new stat-
utes' meaning. For example, the Paperwork Reduction Act, the National En-
vironmental Policy Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act, and the National Technology Transfer and Advance-
ment Act all trigger analyses and duties upon regulatory implementation of
federal statutes.1 4 But they work like checklists, requiring that information be
gathered, reported, and analyzed by agencies before a statute is transformed
from text into executive action. At most, they require burdensome analysis
to be performed within the framework of meaning created by the new
statute."
It is true that procedural requirements placed on agency action could be
so onerous that they affect what an agency is willing to do to implement a
statute.1 6 In that sense, these "directed deliberation" statutes do indeed sub-
ing). RFRA at least preserves the congressional power to override this standard. The argument
I will make here concerns the costs imposed by piling up provisions that may need to be
overridden.
14 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 621-665, 1501-1571 (2012); Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2012); National Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2012); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347
(2012); Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2012).
" See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)
("The sweeping policy goals announced in § 101 of NEPA are thus realized through a set of
'action-forcing' procedures that require that agencies take a 'hard look' at environmental con-
sequences, and that provide for broad dissemination of relevant environmental information.
Although these procedures are almost certain to affect the agency's substantive decision, it is
now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the
necessary process. If the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately
identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other
values outweigh the environmental costs." (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
6 See Andrew L. Levy, The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980: Unnecessary Burdens and
Unrealized Efficiency, 14 J.L. & Com. 99, 99 (1994) (describing the Paperwork Reduction Act
as part of a procedural framework requiring government agencies to consider the costs result-
ing from their actions generally and from information collection specifically); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L.
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tly but substantively affect the meaning of the law in action. But prior legis-
lation that imposes a somewhat standardized tax, in the form of procedural
hurdles, on future statutory implementation tends to be more predictable
than submarines. If a procedure-creating statute is predictably deregulatory,
that may indeed act as a subtle limit on future congressional policymaking
power, but this is not the problem on which I focus here. I do not count such
statutes as submarines, because they do not pose difficulties for determining
the meaning of future statutes.
Second, consider statutes that provide definitions or set policy that will
affect a predictable and small or otherwise clearly defined and related cate-
gory of statutes. The most obvious of these is probably the venerable Dic-
tionary Act-appearing at I U.S.C. § 1 no less." Because it provides
definitions that courts should apply to terms used in future statutes, it is
indeed a submarine statute. I do not see it as particularly problematic,
though. First, when it comes to submarines, we can tolerate a few if they do
not create complex interactions with future statutes. Trouble arises when
there get to be too many such statutes and when their effects come to be too
unpredictable. If the problem is the complexity of the body of pre-existing
laws that could bear on the meaning of new statutes,'8 then having around a
single Dictionary Act that does what it says on the tin does not add signifi-
cant cognitive load to the act of legislation. The burden is lessened even
further if, as is the case, its definitions are relatively easily displaced by
context.' 9 Indeed, it might make legislation less costly by narrowing the
REV. 533, 536 (2000) (providing a chart showing each statute and executive order that a gov-
ernment agency must consider when adopting a rule to show the "enormity" of the "paralysis
by analysis" problem); Helen Leanne Serassio, Legislative and Executive Efforts to Modernize
NEPA and Create Efficiencies in Environmental Review, 45 TEx. ENVTL. L.J. 317, 319 (2015)
(describing NEPA as a "procedural statute" requiring government agencies to take a "hard
look" at the environmental consequences of their actions); see also William R. Sherman, The
Deliberation Paradox and Administrative Law, 2015 BYU L. REv. 413, 458-59 (2015)
(describing each of these statutes as "directed deliberation" statutes, requiring government
agencies to consider specific factors in specific ways when interpreting and implementing laws
and arguing they conflict with "open record" laws).
" The Dictionary Act of 1871 set out definitions for words that might be used in future
legislation and otherwise provided interpretive guidance. It set out, for example, that singular
terms would be interchangeable with plural ones and that masculine terms would mean either
gender. It gave definitions for "insane person," "person," "officer," "oath," and "sworn."
Dictionary Act of 1871, ch. 71, para. 2, 16 Stat. 431 (codified at I U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2012)).
More generally and since codification, all of the relatively brief Chapter 1 of Title I of the
United States Code contains pan-Code definitions of such terms as "vessel," "vehicle," "com-
pany," "person," and "child." 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2012).
1 The development of this complexity argument is taken up in Part III, infra.
' See, e.g., Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199-201 (1993) (noting that the
Dictionary Act itself provides that its definitions may be overridden by "context" and finding
that several features of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (providing that indigent prisoners may be excused
from various court fees) make clear that its use of "person" does not include "associations" of




places a legislator needs to look for an overview of prevailing semantic
meanings. 20
Another statute that on its face was meant to affect future statutory
meaning was the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), which prohibited the
federal recognition of certain marriages. It provided: "In determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress . . . the word 'marriage' means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife . . . ."21 It was
a submarine, but that fact was not among its many legal and moral demerits.
Any future Congress which attempted to regulate using the word "marriage"
would know that the legal definition of that term would be important to the
resolution of disputes under the statute. It would have ready access to re-
search to determine the background legal materials that specifically define it.
While DOMA and a future such statute would be coupled, meaning that
understanding the latter requires understanding the former, the marginal
complexity load created by DOMA would be exceedingly modest.22
Another submarine statute that, unlike DOMA, I very much favor on
policy grounds is more potentially problematic as a submarine: the Endan-
gered Species Act. Section 7 of that Act provides that federal agencies shall
"insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ...
is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species
or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species . . . ."23 This regulation is obviously aimed at agency
implementations of federal law. While it does not explicitly declare that fu-
ture laws will be nullified in applications that would "jeopardize the contin-
ued existence" of endangered species, it does mean that specific purposes a
legislator has in mind in writing statutory text today might take on a differ-
ent meaning as it runs up against the Endangered Species Act in a dispute
tomorrow.2 4
20 At least some of the Dictionary Act's legislative history supports the inference that the
aim of the act was simplicity rather than complicating entrenchment. See Emily J. Barnet,
Hobby Lobby and the Dictionary Act, 124 YALE L.J.F. 11, 12 (2014) (noting that the Act's
"purpose was 'to avoid prolixity and tautology in drawing statutes and to prevent doubt and
embarrassment in their construction"' but that "courts have applied the Act inconsistently for
the past century" (quoting CONG. GoBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1474 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Poland))).
2! Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996), invalidated by United States
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
22 That DOMA was codified in Chapter 1 of Title 1, with other pan-Code definitions, is an
example of the segregation strategy for acceptable submarines that I describe in Part III (C).
23 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). As I discuss in Part IV (B), the very political salience of
the ESA may be a reason to tolerate its submarine character.
24 This unfolded in ferocious and near-absurd form in the saga of the Tellico Dam. The
Tennessee Valley Authority fought to the Supreme Court and, after losing there, began to con-
struct the Tellico Dam despite its likely effect on the endangered snail darter. See generally
Elizabeth Garrett, The Story of TVA v. Hill: Congress Has the Last Word, in STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION STORiEs 58 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett
eds., 2011). The frailty of our legal and factual prognostication is highlighted by both the
failure of the dam to deliver on its economic promise and the post-dam discovery of other
populations of snail darters. See id. at 90.
2018] 191
Harvard Journal on Legislation
Of course, as with all submarines and as with all statutes, the ESA can
be specifically overridden by a future statute.25 As is the case with all stat-
utes, it will not be interpreted to nullify a later-passed statute that directly
conflicts with it, where there is no way to interpret the statutes harmoni-
ously-but only where there is no way to interpret them harmoniously. 26
These examples highlight a few important points. First, not all statutes
that bear on future statutory implementation are submarines. Some impose
only procedures and do not otherwise affect future statutory meaning. Sec-
ond, not all submarine statutes are costly in the sense of imposing confusion
and complexity on the business of legislation. Third, the peculiar cost of
submarine statutes, as will be explored in more detail below, is just that-a
cost. Whether they are worth their costs is a matter of policy judgment, but
that cost must not be ignored.
III. THE PROBLEM OF SUBMARINES
A. Constitutionality
As with other legislative efforts to entrench power, we might object to
submarines on constitutional grounds. 27 Indeed, perhaps the concern that
submarines complicate future legislation can be grounded in some constitu-
tional principle.
Because they do not obviously aggrandize Congress as an institution,
submarine statutes are not clearly targets for separation of powers attacks.
These statutes subtly increase the power of an enacting Congress at the ex-
pense of a future Congress, not another branch. A future Congress will bear
the burden of legislating under, around, or through the submarine. Is this
temporal shift of power constitutional?
Laurence Tribe thinks not. Writing specifically about RFRA, Tribe as-
serts that "[a]utomatically to give determinative weight in such circum-
25 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 102(c), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-555 (1996) ('The provisions of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 are waived to the extent
the Attorney General determines necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers
and roads under this section.").
26 So too, a later-passed statute will not be interpreted, without explicit references, to re-
peal or amend an earlier statute unless there is unavoidable conflict. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of
Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662 (2007) ("While a later enacted statute
(such as the ESA) can sometimes operate to amend or even repeal an earlier statutory provi-
sion (such as the [Clean Water Act]), repeals by implication are not favored and will not be
presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal is clear and manifest. We will not
infer a statutory repeal unless the later statute expressly contradicts the original act or unless
such a construction is absolutely necessary in order that the words of the later statute shall
have any meaning at all." (internal citations and punctuation omitted) (emphasis added)).
27 See generally Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reap-
praisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002) (surveying and rejecting constitutional grounds and policy




stances to previously enacted legislative 'rules' of construction would in a
sense permit an earlier Congress to add to art. I's requirements for the enact-
ment of laws by a later Congress."28 Tribe goes on to argue that RFRA and
the Dictionary Act should not be read as authoritatively guiding statutory
interpretation and therefore should not automatically displace the other inter-
pretive approaches courts might have taken in their absence.2 9
In contrast, Nicholas Rosenkranz has written in favor of both the con-
stitutionality and the wisdom of laws that would explicitly control the judi-
cial interpretations of all other statutes.3 0 His defense of what I call
submarine statutes and what he calls "prospective interpretive" statutes is,
like Tribe's, formal. So long as a statute does not purport to forbid future
legislative override, it does not exceed the bounds of the legislative power."
For example, even if one part of a statute asserts that some other part is
unrepealable, when the asserting text is subject to ordinary repeal, then so,
ultimately, is the nominally "unrepealable" text.
Rosenkranz also gives a structural justification for this formal stance.
He observes that courts must inevitably resort to interpretive rules. Because
there is not a constitutionally required and completely specified set of such
rules, to say that Congress cannot make them is to say that courts have ple-
nary power to do so themselves. This, he claims, would be "an untenable
endorsement of imperial judging."3 2 In any event, Rosenkranz argues, the
polestar for assessing the constitutionality of a prospective interpretive stat-
ute is whether a later Congress can, as a formal matter, "exercise any and all
legislative power" when it wishes.33
Not everyone agrees, however. Larry Alexander and Saikrishna
Prakash believe that prospective interpretive statutes are unconstitutional. 4
Their argument is, first, that the constitutional criteria for congressional ac-
tion cannot be altered by Congress. One Congress may not require future
Congresses to "bark like seals prior to legislating."35 But this conclusion
rests, for Alexander and Prakash, on a supposition that the Constitution man-
dates that statutory interpretation be guided by a form of intentionalism.
28 1 LAURENCE H. TkME, AMEmcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-3, at 125-26 n.1 (3d ed.
2000).
29 Id.
3 See generally Nicholas Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REv. 2085 (2002).
" See id. at 2116-18.
32 Id. at 2119.
1 See id. at 2120.
3 See generally Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing
Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97 (2003).
" Id. at 105. While they may not be forced to bark like seals, no one has suggested a
formal problem with the apparently mandatory enacting and resolving clauses set out by 1
U.S.C. §§ 101 and 102. Acts of Congress "shall" include: "Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled." 1 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2012). Resolutions "shall" include: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled." Id. § 102.
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Rather than assuming that the constitutional founders created an
elaborate structure for writing statutes but wholly failed to provide
for a means of making sense of them, we think it far better to
suppose that the founders contemplated that statutes (and the Con-
stitution more generally) are to be construed consistently with the
intentions of their authors.36
Once you accept that interpretations are to be guided by judicial derivations
of legislative intent, then it follows that the actions of a prior Congress can-
not dislodge an interpretation of a new statute but can at most inform our
search for the drafters' intent.
One's view of the constitutionality of submarine statutes is inevitably
bound to the theory of constitutional interpretation one assumes. Scholars
can and should continue to converse about the fit of submarines, as a class of
legislative action, with various possible constitutional commitments. Such
dialogue is an indispensable part of the process of constitutional govern-
ment. My own concern, however, is more basic, more agnostic as to inter-
pretive theory, and goes to institutional policy rather than the formal
drawing of lines of authority. Rosenkranz acknowledges that there might be
a "potent policy objection[ ]" to prospective interpretive statutes on the
ground that they "perhaps influence[ ] too much the work of future con-
gresses." But in focusing chiefly on formal constitutional problems, none
of these discussants has grappled directly with the wisdom of legislating
against a background of highly coupled legislative code.
B. Complexity: The Submarine's Peculiar Weapon
Law, like software code, is more easily understood when it is simple
and modular.38 As Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill have observed in the
context of property law, bundling complexity inside discrete objects that ex-
pose only simple interfaces saves what would be high costs of interaction
were our descriptions of things always in terms of basic components.39 When
land "ownership," for example, comes in just a few flavors (such as various
fees simple, leases, and life estates) transaction is simpler than if a buyer had
to make a de novo inventory of all possible claims and relationships that
humans could imagine and construct with respect to a piece of land.
6 Alexander & Prakash, supra note 34, at 106.
* Rosenkranz, supra note 30, at 2120.
38 See, e.g., William Li et al., Law Is Code: A Software Engineering Approach to Analyz-
ing the United States Code, 10 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 297, 297-98 (2015); Christian Turner,
Models of Law, 2018 U. ILL. L. REv. pt. III(C) (forthcoming 2018).
" See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000); see also Thomas W.
Merrill, Property as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REv. 151, 155-56 (2012); Henry E. Smith,
Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REv. 1691, 1693 (2012).
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When separate instances of lawmaking are coupled, meaning only that
they affect one another, understanding and making law is more difficult:
The coupling of various parts of the U.S. Code creates nonlineari-
ties that can make the code more challenging to parse and revise.
In particular, a reader must now explore different "pathways" of
references to fully understand a certain domain of law. Further-
more, revisions to any part of a chain of references could contrib-
ute to unknown, unintended downstream effects. 40
A legislator attempting to enact policy does so with an understanding of
the social environment, a mental model of the Supreme Court's practice with
respect to the Constitution and other statutes, and models of his or her own
institution's prior output. 4 1 The latter models mainly comprise overview-level
understandings of the U.S. Code and certain principles concerning institu-
tional functioning and the recognition of institutional outputs. The legislator
will understand that he or she is legislating against a background but wants
to identify a clear path to achieving a specific set of purposes and perhaps,
with less certainty, more general purposes. The more extensive the cross-
references that will bear on the meaning of the new statute, the harder that
job becomes. Hidden cross-references are anathema.42
Now, I do not mean to suggest that the primary problem here is the
unpredictability of future applications. Many statutes will have uncertain ef-
fects in future cases because they set out standards that depend on social
factors that are subject to cultural and technological change. 43 The problem is
not that the experience of the law will diverge from a narrow-bore zone of
expected application or that we will be deprived of what could otherwise be
a mechanical jurisprudence. As H.L.A. Hart put it:
[W]e are men, not gods. It is a feature of the human predicament
(and so of the legislative one) that we labour under two connected
* Li, supra note 38, at 313; see also R. Barry Ruback, Warranted and Unwarranted Com-
plexity in the U.S. Sentencing Guideline, 20 LAW & POL'Y 231, 376 (1998) (analyzing indica-
tors of complexity, including cross-references to other guidelines).
41 Turner, supra note 38, at pt. III(D).
42 See, e.g., Thomas F. Blackwell, Finally Adding Method to Madness: Applying Princi-
ples of Object-Oriented Analysis and Design to Legislative Drafting, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. PoL'Y 227, 284-85 (1999) ("Use of the Low Coupling pattern would suggest minimiza-
tion of cross-references between sections. The High Cohesion pattern requires that the respon-
sibilities of each object be strongly related and focused. These and other patterns could be used
by the drafter to standardize treatment of similar drafting issues.").
" Consider, for example, the statutory fair-use test in the law of copyright. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2012). By the narrowest possible margin, the Supreme Court held that the use of a
videotape recorder to time-shift television programs was a fair one, and partly for this reason,
the soon-ubiquitous technology survived a copyright challenge to its existence. See Sony Corp.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-56 (1984). Fair use now determines what
may be shared by average users on the internet without the explicit permission of authors.
Needless to say, the world in which it now applies is utterly alien to that of the fair-use test's
codification.
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handicaps whenever we seek to regulate, unambiguously and in
advance, some sphere of conduct by means of general standards to
be used without further official direction on particular occasions.
The first handicap is our relative ignorance of fact: the second is
our relative indeterminacy of aim."
The problem of submarines, however, is that they might, either alone or
in combination, create unmanageable complexity that will exist from the leg-
islative point of view at the moment a new statute is conceived. This is not
the usual and unavoidable legislative circumstance that, as humans "and not
gods," legislators cannot be sure whether they will agree with the resolution
of a future dispute in which the statutory language is interpreted and applied.
Rather, the legislator will not know the meaning of what he or she is now
doing.
The difference is as between two architects. One of them designs a
building for a distinct purpose but with the knowledge that needs and uses
will change over time. She takes aim with that immediate purpose in mind
but also, with the aid of imagination and analysis, tries to achieve some
flexibility in the design to respond to anticipated needs in the future. The
building will almost surely become obsolete one day, but she at least knows
what she is designing it to accomplish today. She, nonetheless, can never
escape Hart's conundrum and is not so foolish to believe she can.
The second architect tries to draw plans to meet current needs but finds
herself in a far more frustrating position. The builders will indeed work with
her plans, but now suppose there are other, pre-existing plans and instruc-
tions that the builders are required to interpret as modifying the architect's
plan. Some of these other instructions are known to the architect, some not,
with the challenge and frustration increasing rapidly with the number of such
other plans. Unless the architect takes account of these modifying plans, the
result will be a building that is in fact designed by no one. Legislating in a
complex informational environment similarly taxes a cognitive faculty other
than imagination. Our second architect, like a legislator trying to take ac-
count of many submarine statutes, is surely not a god, but neither is she even
truly the architect.
While submarine statutes stereotypically impose this sort of complex-
ity-related cost, some might actually generate complexity-related savings.
When statutes are passed that define characteristics of classes of statutes, it
can help future legislators craft members of that class. Rather than re-invent
the wheel, they can declare their new statute to be a member of the class and
automatically inherit the characteristics previously defined as belonging to
class members. Submarines can thus be part of an efficient, object-oriented
' H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994).
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design. 45 Such submarines enhance rather than detract from a legislator's un-
derstanding of her work.
Whether a statute is a potentially damaging submarine or part of an
integrated class definition depends on whether the class is sufficiently intui-
tive and whether the statutes defining the class are sufficiently basic and
general. Baude and Sachs convincingly argue, for example, that the basic
federal criminal statutes defining important features of the class of federal
criminal laws "free[s]" Congress rather than "tying [its] hands." 46
C. Fit with the Initial, Individual Intention Thesis
If complexity is the potential consequence of submarine statutes, we are
now ready to make a normative judgment arising from another commitment
that I assert is foundational: As a matter of sound governance, we should
desire first and foremost that legislative acts be the products of reason. To
create reasoned products, legislators need to understand what the words they
write mean. Of course, they will lack the authority to control the translation
of that meaning into future action or even the evolution of that meaning in
new semantic environments. They are not judges and juries. That is, again,
not the issue. Rather, what they must at least understand is what they them-
selves, as individual legislators, mean upon legislating. They must have an
initial, individual intention.
Whether one agrees with that statement because intention is implicit in
reasoned decision-making, which is in turn implicit in the very concept of
legislative action; whether one believes action with intention is necessary for
recognizing legislative authority; or whether for some other reason, I find
the principle to be clearly a part of the law we have. 47
But the initial possible meanings of a law in a regime thickly patrolled
by submarine statutes would be a most uncertain thing. A legislator reducing
his intention to the words of a draft bill might introduce one zone of mean-
ings in the minds of fellow legislators but then later find its semantic content
had diverged immediately upon passage, through a cascade of interactions
with all the submarine statutes. Like a grand old game of Plinko, a puck
bouncing from place to place in a random walk," the statute emerges into
the world upon enactment not in isolation but as a product of interactions
45 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
' See Baude & Sachs, supra note 5, at 1101-02 (pointing to a federal criminal law back-
ground that includes rules covering conspiracy, "witness tampering, speedy trials, [and] the
criminal jurisdiction of the district courts" (citations omitted)).
4 The justifications vary, but rational basis review of legislation ultimately looks for the
existence of a legitimate reason as a criterion of constitutionality. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). Reasonableness is otherwise scattered throughout our con-
stitutional, statutory, and constitutional law as a basic criterion of legitimate decision-making.
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with other statutes, whether or not even a single legislator had tracked its
wandering path.
The intentionalist view of interpretation that Alexander and Prakash
take is not necessary to appreciate this aspect of the submarine danger. 49
Many interpretive methodologies at the very least assume that legislators
have acted with intentions, even those methodologies that do not direct adju-
dicators to search for them. We can divide the world of interpretive commit-
ments in several ways, all corresponding to models of information flows
among institutions together with secondary rules concerning the relative au-
thority of those institutions.5 0 For example, we can label as textualist the
privileging by an interpreting institution of semantic meanings as they would
have been drawn from the bare text by the drafters themselves or by the
drafters' contemporary audience or principal. Alternatively, a textualist court
might concern itself with how a modern reader might fairly interpret a docu-
ment's words. We could even ask further about audience: whether the textual
interpreter should be expert or lay in the field the text concerns, for example.
And so the choice among interpretive techniques involves modeling authors
and audiences and deciding to privilege one or more potential processors
within that model as solely or jointly authoritative.'
For now, though, it is enough to observe that the interpretive landscape
can also reasonably be described by the standard tripartite interpretive taxon-
omy (textualism, purposivism, and intentionalism) together with a time di-
mension.52 Because our analysis of submarines concerns the problems of
finding meaning in a complex environment of coupled texts and because the
very things these schools of "isms" distinguish among are disparate concep-
tions of how meaning arises from a text, one might suspect that attitudes
toward submarines are a function of methodological choice. This is not so. A
crucial principle among virtually all interpretive schools is that a legislator
who wants to accomplish some task ought to be able to do it, within the
bounds of the Constitution, so long as he or she speaks plainly enough about
that thing. Whether her intention or a hypothetical audience's interpretation
of her output controls," intention conveyed with plain enough speech ought
to be recoverable under any of the dominant methodologies.5 4
4 See supra Part HI.A.
50 See Turner, supra note 38, at pt. IV(C).
5 See id.
52 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 117, 123-24 (2009).
" For example, original public meaning originalism can be conceived as channeling the
interpretation that reasonable readers among that electorate contemporary with authorship
would have made. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content,
89 NoTRE DAMtE L. REV. 479, 498 (2013).
'
4 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court ... must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
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We therefore need not take a view here on the strengths and weaknesses
of the interpretive "isms," because they all condemn the submarine. If your
theory is, say, public meaning originalism (of whatever more particular fla-
vor) on legitimacy grounds, you would be hard pressed to defend the unex-
pected intrusion of a submarine in resolving a case. The legitimacy of the
statute would turn on its hypothetical acceptance-political ratification, es-
sentially-by those who elect the legislators. What would those electors
have thought, reading the statute's text, their legislators had accomplished?
First, unless the electors believed the authors of the text acted individually
with intention, they could hardly make a conventional interpretation at all.
Without intention, a text is not a communication so much as it is just data
arising from the natural world. It exists. It was caused by events. But it does
not represent meaning conveyed by an utterer. 5
Second, unless the electorate themselves took account of the submarine,
they would interpret the statute not to mean what readers of both the statute
and the submarine believed the statute would mean. In a submarine-thick
legislating environment, the very reason we resorted to this sort of original-
ism-that we favored democratic accountability over judicial technoc-
racy 6 -is lost. Voters would not be able to assign responsibility for laws,
because they would not understand their meanings. Indeed, public meaning
originalism only "works" in a world in which the legislators and their elec-
torate both take account of the submarine.
Original Public Meaning
Originalism and Awareness
of Submarines Legislator aware Legislator unaware
Electorate aware Good statute Ratification of unreasoned
product
Electorate unaware No democratic ratification Unratified, unreasoned
product
The above is more a caricature of a method than a deep engagement. I
hereby apologize to true originalists. My point is only to indicate that an
interpretive theory that is at peace with torpedo-firing submarines, regardless
of the costs they impose, is difficult to conceive. For inevitably, the primacy
of a legislature's text, intentions, or purposes is upset when we wrongly as-
sume their work was the product of the fully considered but unstated
Dworkinian accounting for and accommodation of a background of subma-
" See, e.g., JoHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTs: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
16-17 (1969) ("If I regard [the mark someone has made on a piece of paper] as a natural
phenomenon like the wind in the trees or a stain on the paper, I exclude it from the class of
linguistic communication, even though [it] maybe be indistinguishable from . . . written
words.").
16 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17-18 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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rine statutes all jockeying to have a piece of the interpretive pie.57 If a statute
is passed that is unexpectedly semantically altered by submarines, it does not
reflect individual legislators' intentions, and its claim to authority is thus
weakened.
D. Courts or Legislatures?
Another way of considering the complexity problem posed by a
proliferation of submarines is to imagine the position of a legislator in a
legislature in which authorship of new laws is never on a clean slate. The
conscientious legislator in this environment must now become a common
law judge. The meaning of what is written today would depend on a body of
unrelated statutes written in days gone by.
A legislature attempting to convey meaning will thus inevitably find
itself in the position of Dworkin's Hercules,"8 laboring to make an interpreta-
tion of a body of statutory precedent before it can understand the likely force
that new provisions would, even in the legislators' own minds, have. But that
exercise is quintessentially judicial, and there is no guarantee that legislators
are skilled at that kind of research (or at managing that research by others).
Legislation is about relatively clean slates and producing new authority
through the consensus of coalitions,59 not the interpolation of a rich universe
of precedent.60
Furthermore, the incentives for open, Herculean deliberation are
skewed in the legislative context. Perhaps in trying to pass a statute, political
considerations would rule out exempting the statute from all existing subma-
rines or even just a specific submarine. It is easy to understand why, for
example, it would be difficult explicitly to waive laws meant to protect
majoritarian religious practices. The cost of legislation would include the
cost of revealing a legislator's preferences on the subject matter of applicable
submarines. For example, the Affordable Care Act's passage was notoriously
tight. Debating the applicability of RFRA to various of its provisions would
likely have derailed proceedings despite legislative agreement on the broader
framework.61
" See RONALD DWORKTN, LAW's EMPIRE 311, 318-20 (1986).
* See id.
59 Or, at least, slates not so severely obscured by coupled texts. Yes, I am aware all slates
in government are a bit dirty. But I am suggesting an aspirational and general principle to
which submarines do unusual violence.
' This notion, that legislators should not have to interpolate a statutory background in
order to express meaning, concerns the business of supplying legislative materials for adjudi-
cation. It does not speak to the demand side, the judicial use of what is supplied. A legislature
could assiduously avoid passing submarines while the judiciary could simultaneously and
without contradiction treat statutes like judicial precedents, giving them weight beyond mere
text but as sources of the principles to be used in a Dworkinian analysis. Cf Harlan F. Stone,
The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REV. 4, 12-13 (1936).
6' The objection here is not that submarines remove the option to agree to ambiguity
thereby removing a strategy to achieve the necessary consensus for passage. See, e.g., Victoria
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It is similarly easy to imagine situations in which a legislator's objective
might be furthered by his or her colleagues' failure to recognize the applica-
bility of submarines. In this case, agreement would be reached on passage
but not on initial meaning. Because legislators, unlike judges, need not and
typically do not support their enactments with reasoned argument, they are
more able to avoid discussing important legal background that will affect the
meaning of the words they enact. Judges, in contrast to legislators, do give
reasons and are thus more likely to surface the degree to which their fitting
and justifying took account of the pre-existing legal landscape. The nature
and procedures of courts, therefore, help explain why their central feature-
taking account and marshaling the implications of a large body of prior ac-
tions-is not as potentially destructive to their function as that activity
would be to legislatures.
All that said, the creation of a taxingly complex interpretive back-
ground could also arise in courts, but there is less reason for concern. Let us
consider a "judicial submarine." Imagine a Supreme Court ruling that all
future, unrelated judgments the Court issues will count as precedent only in
situations X, Y, and Z and only in sense Q. The authority of any later deci-
sion would only be calculable by also taking account of this ruling. Perhaps
the closest we have to such a super-holding is Marks v. United States,62
which sets out the way to interpret the holding of a fractured Supreme Court:
"When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judg-
ment on the narrowest grounds."63 This is indeed a statement concerning
how lower courts should interpret future rulings of the Court and therefore a
submarine. But while it creates some puzzles,64 it does not combine with
those future rulings substantively to produce guidance unanticipated by any
of the authors of the future rulings. By its terms, the Marks holding tells
lower courts to identify the authoritative meaning of a future precedent by
identifying meanings explicitly communicated in that precedent by members
of the Court, in a context in which the justices themselves will know that the
F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case
Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 596 (2002). Rather, the submarine injects in deliberations, on
those occasions in which the submarine is identified, the need to resolve an issue that may be
controversial even if no ambiguity would be created either by ignoring it or legislating around
it. In such cases, there would be an incentive to ignore the submarine, which, even if a coher-
ent approach, is hardly the legislative equivalent of Dworkinian fit and justification.
62 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
63 Id. at 193 (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
' See generally, e.g., Berkolow, Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent
Amidst the Cacophony of Concurrences, and Repercolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. Soc.
PoL'Y & L. 299 (2008); Joseph M. Cacace, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the
United States: A Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 97 (2007); Linas E. Ledebur, Plurality Rule: Concurring Opinions and a
Divided Supreme Court, 113 PA. ST. L. REV. 899 (2009); W. Jesse Weins, A Problematic
Plurality Precedent: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Marks over Van Orden v. Perry, 85
NEB. L. REv. 830 (2007).
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ruling is fractured. And, in any event, the ultimate interpretation of such a
split decision will be reviewable by the Court itself. In a nutshell, the Marks
rule does not couple with future decisions in the way RFRA couples with all
future statutes. Judges may need to emulate Hercules in order to gather the
legal data that should guide their decisions, but they can write with
authority.6 5
IV. QUASI-CONSTITUTIONALIZATION AND SUPER-STATUTIFICATION
Despite the costs imposed by submarine statutes, there are strategies to
reduce their costs and to help justify the possession by some statutes of
greater than normal prospective influence. First, statutes might mimic in
form or substance their hierarchically superior cousins: constitutional provi-
sions. Second, some statutes may attain such levels of public and official
ratification that they stand apart from ordinary statutes. Either way, causing
submarine statutes to stand apart, so that they are recognized as basic or
fundamental law, can point the way to controlling the complexity problem
while allowing Congress some latitude to create statutory dependencies. In
particular, RFRA's submarine character could possibly be justified under ei-
ther of these theories.
A. Quasi-Constitutionalization
By rhetorically assimilating submarines with bodies of law that are
well-recognized for creating dependencies but that are uncontroversial in
that respect, a proponent can normalize their exceptional character. One way
to do this is to quasi-constitutionalize them, by which I mean to use rhetoric
that treats them like sources of constitutional principles. This makes mere
statutes appear to be expected and background parts of the necessary uni-
verse of law's materials, the sort of basic laws of which any conscientious
legislator should be aware and that do not impose substantial cognitive load.
Rather than apparently and annoyingly creating an interfering static within
the legislator's own institution, the submarine is made by rhetoric to stand
apart. Then, despite the submarine's legislative origin and its actual and more
modest claim to authority, its conflict and fit with the statutes it appears to
regulate can be understood in the ordinary way we mediate statutory pur-
poses and constitutional purposes. It, like the freedom of speech or equal
6 There is a legislative equivalent to Marks that I find to be similarly unproblematic. I
U.S.C. § 108 (2012) provides that a congressional repeal of statute A that had itself repealed
statute B does not have the effect of re-enacting statute B. This provision only applies when
legislators would understand that their repeal must either be read to have a reviving effect or
not. It would seem unreasonable to suppose that their silence on this matter would reflect
anything other than conscious resort to a default rule. Further, this repeal default is segregated
into a Code Chapter concerned with the default interpretation of congressional actions (similar




protection, is now part of the limited universe of rules a legislator under-
stands will affect his or her work.
There is some, very casual, evidence that quasi-constitutionalization of
submarines occurs. For example, in a recent oral argument concerning
RFRA's effect on an Obamacare-derived regulation, Chief Justice Roberts
produced the following slip of the tongue, conflating RFRA's provisions
with those of the Constitution. When the Solicitor General noted that com-
plying with RFRA by offering separate, contraception-only health coverage
on ACA exchanges would require a change in federal law, the Chief Justice
responded, "Well, the way constitutional objections work is you might have
to change current law."" Of course, RFRA is not a part of the Constitution.
The standards for religious exemptions it contains once were, however.6 1
The collision of legislative purposes with constitutional principles oc-
curs in a context in which those principles, by virtue of being constitutional,
are (a) hierarchically superior and (b) small in number. Their potential inter-
ference is further damped by the fact that they are administered by a court
that must show some concern with preserving legislative power over public
policy.
Substantively, constitutional limits usually arise from more basic prin-
ciples of government and morality. While the lines they draw are debatable
and cannot be intuited with precision, their bare applicability to a statutory
provision often can. To the extent that is so, the initial intention of a legisla-
tor is more likely to take account of them. Hierarchically superior limits that
are intuitive, at least with respect to subject matter if not in detail, do not
pose the same risk as scattered and multitudinous provisions. 8
Beyond these structural and substantive features that help to control the
constitutional complexity problem, courts have helped by deploying several
tools. For example, judicial review is mostly binary, with constitutional re-
' Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 14-
1418) [hereinafter Zubik argument]. The very idea that an otherwise and generally intransigent
Congress might amend Obamacare to achieve a salutary purpose resulted in "(Laughter.)." Id.
7 And I suppose they could be again if the Court saw fit to overrule Employment Division
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (rejecting strict scrutiny of otherwise valid and neutral laws
of general applicability that happen to burden religious exercise). But as Justice Breyer sug-
gested in the oral argument in Zubik, the substantive difficulties of applying RFRA perhaps
demonstrate the wisdom of foregoing judicial, individualized exception-creation in this area.
Zubik argument, supra note 66, at 22-23.
6 See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited,
81 U. Cm. L. REv. 1641, 1653-81 (2014) (comparing the Constitution's brevity and small
scope to the length and expansiveness of state constitutions and noting the corresponding rates
of revision of state constitutions). Versteeg and Zackin point out that the scope of state consti-
tutions (and those of other nations) "has grown to such a degree that they now routinely cover
topics far afield from fundamental rights and basic governmental structure," including the
designation of state holidays, "a host of policy choices," the protection of many non-tradi-
tional rights, and substantive regulations. Id. at 1659-60. Entrenching so much policy in a
hierarchically superior law where that law is subject to frequent revision creates a formal two-
track system of legal regulation and change. The complexity implications of such a formalized
system of submarines is well worth further analysis.
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view resulting in either approval or invalidation. It is, in the main, a blunt
instrument and therefore either gives full effect to congressionally generated
meaning or none at all. When review becomes something in between, posing
the risk of altering the statute's meaning from that which it would be if ascer-
tained purely under an expected method of interpretation, it becomes contro-
versial. 69 I do not mean to criticize the constitutional avoidance doctrine or
to indicate that I believe in the possibility of an acceptable interpretive meth-
odology that can be applied mechanically and without discretion. (I do not.)
Rather, I do this only to indicate that (a) the use of even those submarines
that are actual constitutional provisions can be controversial and (b) this con-
troversy is quietest when constitutional submarines are blunt in effect and
limited in number. In other words, they are least problematic when they
generate minimal legislative complexity.
RFRA might be defended on such grounds. It modifies basic law con-
cerning free exercise but does not create a new category of basic law. In that
sense, it does not add to the subject-matter catalog of cross-references. A
legislator with an initial intention would already be aware that religious ex-
ercise is a subject of applicable law. But RFRA does create, as did pre-Smith
constitutional law, special difficulties in formulating a statute from an initial
intention if the scale of potential exemptions is large and uncertain.
B. Super-Statutification
Even if they are not attached remora-like to the small body of constitu-
tional provisions, some submarine statutes might achieve a level of promi-
nence and a basic quality that distinguishes them from the mass of the U.S.
Code. Here, I rely on the work of William Eskridge and John Ferejohn. 0
They define as "super-statutes" those that (a) are designed to change sub-
stantially a principle or principles underlying prevailing regulation, (b) do in
fact achieve that through a process "of evolution and debate" that causes the
new principle to "'stick[ ]' in the public culture in a deep way, becoming
foundational or axiomatic to our thinking," and (c) are ultimately given "ex-
pansive, imperial interpretation."7 The examples they give include those
whose names and general purposes are known to many: the Sherman Anti-
trust Act of 1890, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Endangered Species
Act. 72
There are elements of this definition that would mark out acceptable
submarines: namely that they attain in the minds of the public and in judicial
69 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Pres-
ervation of Judicial Review, 78 Thx. L. REV. 1549, 1578 (2000) (surveying criticism that the
constitutional avoidance doctrine "supplants an otherwise-preferable reading of [a] statute in
all cases in which it makes a difference").
70 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DuKE L.J. 1215 (2001).
71 Id. at 1219, 1230-31.
72 Id. at 1231-46; see also supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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interpretation a fundamental and intuitive status. Such statutes have, by defi-
nition, joined the pantheon of socio-legal axioms and therefore would not
substantially add to the cognitive load facing a legislator attempting to act on
an initial intention. Given the extreme difficulty of amending the Constitu-
tion, it is not surprising that moments of unusual deliberation and consensus
would be reflected in "statutory" rather than "constitutional" moments, in
which "higher lawmaking . . . altering the normative foundations of public
discourse" occurs through formally ordinary but culturally extraordinary
means.73
There is, however, a problem. Eskridge and Ferejohn recognize that this
special status is not bom with the statute. Rather, only over time and after
bearing the badges and scars of judicial contest and public deliberation does
a statute become (and, they argue, should become) a source of basic princi-
ple to be used in a common-law manner. 74 My concern is not with ex post
judgments concerning the constitutionality of submarine statutes, but instead
with the wisdom of adopting them in the first place. If super-statutory status
is only attained over time, then it cannot be relied upon when considering a
submarine statute at its inception-even if that statute might prove in time
not to be costly.
Perhaps submarine statutes that aspire to super-statutory status could be
justified if they contain a sunset clause. If a legislature intends to alter or
create a basic principle, one for which there is clamor and which appears to
reflect deep and intuitive legal understandings, then maybe that is an indica-
tion that the submarine should be given a shot. Either the projection that the
submarine will bear unusually low cost will come to pass or it will fail to
come to pass in advance of the sunset date.
C. Submarine Segregation
At the very least, to preserve contemporary legislative supremacy and
wrest power from dead hands, we should catalog submarine statutes in a
separate volume. Like the Constitution itself, they would stand apart as con-
trolling the environment in which a new legislative initiative would be inter-
preted. Unlike the Constitution, though, they can be decommissioned by a
legislature aware of them. Again, there may be political economy reasons to
suspect that the positive act of waiver would impose political costs and that
the past is thereby constraining the present. But discrete cataloging would at
least "get the dragon out of [its] cave" so we can count its scales. 75
73 See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 70, at 1269.
74 See id. at 1216, 1231, 1247.
7 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
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V. CONCLUSION
RFRA's particular demerit is not, as far as I have been able to gather,
nearly so common that the complexity danger has tipped over into semantic
crisis.7 6 Indeed, RFRA's seeming rarity as a true submarine that has been
adjudicated to have a controversial effect on a later-passed statute may ob-
scure the very problem with submarine statutes. Even if one finds RFRA
tolerable because of its perceived benefits, its submarine character should be
recognized and kept deviant.
The demand for submarine statutes, though, could grow. Consider a
proposal by former presidential candidate Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL): "It
is for this reason that I have proposed that Congress establish a national
regulatory budget, which would require that new, costly regulations be offset
by the repeal of other existing regulations." 7 It was an odd proposal to be
set amidst other points Rubio made supporting greater, rather than lesser,
congressional control over agency rule-making. This "regulatory budget"
would potentially restrain an agency even from enacting regulations clearly
contemplated in later-enacted statutes and therefore clearly intended by the
enacting congress. Of course, a new statute that Congress desires be given
effect without regard to other statutes can include a general or specific
waiver. But that is the very problem with submarine statutes. They require
Congress when doing anything new to contemplate and keep track of their
existence, to anticipate whether they might present a problem, and to enact
specific waivers that themselves have political economy effects.
Of course, a court could come to the rescue by observing a fundamental
incompatibility and giving overriding effect to the later-passed statute. And
it could do so in less than truly fundamental situations when it recognizes a
complexity-caused irrationality." Perhaps it would not be completely candid
76 Baude and Sachs helpfully collect and discuss a few more examples that I would char-
acterize as submarines, though their costs are likely low on grounds given above. Baude &
Sachs, supra note 5, at 1099-104.
n Marco Rubio, A Step Toward Freedom: Reduce the Number of Crimes, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/step-toward-freedom-re
duce-number-crimes [https://perma.cc/S523-VVER]. This suggestion has moved beyond a
mere proposal. In the opening days of his presidency, President Trump issued an executive
order requiring just this sort of one-for-two promulgation. See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed.
Reg. 9339, 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017). Because it is an executive order, it raises issues that are
distinct from those under study here, but it nonetheless illuminates a way that the Executive
Branch can create legal background against which statutory meaning will be worked out.
7 Some judges would eschew this sort of fix. Emblematic of their disinclination is this
passage from a recent dissent: "If a statute needs repair, there's a constitutionally prescribed
way to do it. It's called legislation. To be sure, the demands of bicameralism and presentment
are real and the process can be protracted. But the difficulty of making new laws isn't some
bug in the constitutional design: it's the point of the design, the better to preserve liberty.
Besides, the law of unintended consequences being what it is, judicial tinkering with legisla-
tion is sure only to invite trouble." Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1975, 1990 (2017)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). While a great deal is left unjustified in this statement, it reflects the
hesitation some judges would have with the judicial rationalization approach to submarines.
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as it did so, in pursuit of systemic effectiveness. For someone, like me, who
prefers candor, this would not be an optimal response to unaccounted-for
legislative costs.
Whether the costs of submarines are controlled by legislative forbear-
ance, by constitutional adjudication, or by courts' less than candid interpreta-
tion, the issues discussed here provide a reason to view these statutes with
special attention to the legislative complexity they create. Even if the
problems I have highlighted should not invariably be fatal to the creation or
application of submarine statutes, they should counsel care.

